Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2002

State of Utah v. Daniel J. Peterson : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Margaret P. Lindsay; Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin; Attorney for Appellant.
Marian Decker; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; John Easton;
Deputy Utah County Attorney; Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Peterson, No. 20020341 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3780

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
DANIEL J. PETERSON,

Case No. 20020341-CA

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR POSSESSION
OF METHAMPHETAMINE, A THIRD DEGREE
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 5837-8(2)(a)(i), (4)(a), (c) (1998 & Supp. 2002), AND
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA IN A
DRUG-FREE ZONE, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37a-5 and
58-37-8(4)(a), (c) (1998 & Supp. 2002), IN THE FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE JAMES R.
TAYLOR, PRESIDING
MARIAN DECKER (5688)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

MARGARET P. LINDSAY
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT &
ESPLIN
43 East 200 North
PO Box "L"
Provo,Utah 84603-0200

JOHN EASTON
Deputy Utah County Attorney

Attorney for Appellant

Attorneys for Appellee

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 20020341-CA

DANIEL J. PETERSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR POSSESSION
OF METHAMPHETAMINE, A THIRD DEGREE
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 5837-8(2)(a)(i), (4)(a), (c) (1998 & Supp. 2002), AND
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA IN A
DRUG-FREE ZONE, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37a-5 and
58-37-8(4)(a), (c) (1998 & Supp. 2002), IN THE FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE JAMES R.
TAYLOR, PRESIDING
MARIAN DECKER (5688)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

MARGARET P. LINDSAY
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT &
ESPLIN
43 East 200 North
PO Box "L"
Provo,Utah 84603-0200

JOHN EASTON
Deputy Utah County Attorney

Attorney for Appellant

Attorneys for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

6

ARGUMENT
WHERE A BAREFOOT AND LIGHTLY DRESSED DEFENDANT
FRIGHTENED BOTH POLICE AND THE APARTMENT TENANT
BY SUDDENLY BOLTING FROM A CLOSET IN A DARK
BEDROOM, POLICE DID NOT EXCEED THE SCOPE OF AN
OTHERWISE JUSTIFIED TERRY FRISK BY CHECKING THE
DISCARDED JACKET AND SHOES AT HIS FEET FOR WEAPONS
CONCLUSION

6
17

Addendum - Oral Ruling

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
California v.HodariD., 499 U.S. 621(1991)
Michigan v. Long,463 U.S. 1032 (1983)

14
passim

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)

7

Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1992)

9

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)

passim

United States v. Edwards, 644 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.),
cert, denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981)
United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1980)

14
9

United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985)

11

United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088 (11th Cir. 2002)

14

STATE CASES
American Fork v. Singleton, 2002 UT app 331, 57 P.3d 1124
Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, 52 P.3d 1158

16
16

Jordan v. State, 531 A.2d 1028 (Md. App. 1987)

9

People v. Bowles, 289 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1968), cert, denied, 396 U.S. 865 (1969)

13

State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219, 51 P.3d 55,
cert, denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002)
Servis v. Commonwealth, 371 S.E.2d 156 (Va. App. 1988)
State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, cert, denied, 11Z P.2d45 (Utah 1989)
State v. Belgard, 840 P.2d 819 (Utah App. 1992)
ii

11
8
16
9

State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866 (Utah App. 1992)
State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App. 1991
State v.Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994)

12, 15
12
7,15

State v. Ortiz, 683 P.2d 822 (Haw. 1984)

9

State v. Ramirez, 814 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991)

16

State v. Schultz, 491 N.E.2d 735 (Ohio App. 1985)

11

State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979 (Utah App. 1993)

10, 12

State v. Tetmeyer, 947 P.2d 1157 (Utah App. 1997)

3

State v. Vasquez, 807 P.2d 520 (Ariz. 1991)

13

State v. Wells, 928 P.2d 386 (Utah App. 1996)

12

FEDERAL STATUTES
U.S. Const, amend. IV

2
STATE STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1998 & Supp. 2002)

1, 2

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998 & Supp. 2002)

1, 2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996 & Supp. 2001)

1

OTHER WORK CITED
4 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure, §9.5 (3rd ed. 1996)

iii

13

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
DANIEL J. PETERSON,

Case No. 20020341-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of methamphetamine, a third
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (4)(a), (c) (1998 &
Supp. 2002), and possession of paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor,
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37a-5 and 58-37-8(4)(a), (c) (1998 & Supp.
2002). This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1996 & Supp. 2001).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Where a barefoot defendant frightened police and the apartment tenant by
suddenly bolting from a closet in a dark bedroom, did police exceed the scope of an
otherwise justified Terryfriskby checking the discarded jacket and shoes at defendant's
feet for weapons?1
'See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. CONST, amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine in a drug-free-zone,
a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (4)(a), (c)
(1998 & Supp. 2002), and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free-zone, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37a-5, and 58-37-8(4)(a), (c) (1998
& Supp. 2002). Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a
warrantless search (R30-23).2 Following an evidentiary hearing on 24 January 2002, the
trial court orally denied the motion (R210:47-52) (a copy of the trial court's oral ruling is
attached).
Thereafter, defendant was tried by a jury and convicted for the lesser-included
offense of possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony (R129). He was
convicted as charged for possession of paraphernalia in a drug-free-zone, a class A
misdemeanor (id.). The trial court imposed an indeterminate term of 0-5 years for the
felony offense and a concurrent indeterminate term of 1 year for the misdemeanor offense
(R194-1933).

2

The record is numbered in reverse chronological order..
2

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R198).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS3
Police were performing a consensual welfare check on Dawn Webster's children
when a lightly dressed and barefoot defendant suddenly emerged from a closet in a dark
bedroom, startling both Dawn and police. Defendant was immediately handcuffed and
frisked for weapons, revealing paraphernalia and drugs in the discarded jacket and shoes
at his feet.
On 28 December 2001, Officer Billings of the Provo City Police Department
received an anonymous report that methamphetamine was being used by injection in front
of small children at Dawn's apartment, located at 974 West 600 South, #7B (R205:6;
R210:4; R212:105). Officer Billings and three other officers went to the apartment to
perform a "welfare check" (R205:6-7; R210:4) (R212:105). When Officer Billings
knocked on the door, Dawn's approximately 50-year old mother answered (R205:18;
R212:108). Dawn came to the door shortly thereafter (R205:7-8; R212:108). She
consented to let the officers enter and search her apartment and belongings (R205:7-8;
R210:4; R212:108). Officer Billings followed Dawn to the main bedroom, approximately
25 feet from the front door (R205: R210:5; R212:109).

3

The facts are stated in the light most favorable to the trial court ruling denying
defendant's motion to suppress. State v. Tetmeyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App.
1997). The trial court relied on the preliminary hearing transcript {see R210:4), in
addition to evidence adduced at the suppression hearing; therefore, the State has included
citations to the preliminary hearing transcript {see R205), along with citations to the
suppression hearing {see R210), and trial {see R212) transcripts, in support of the trial
court's ruling.
3

The bedroom was unusually dark because the shades were drawn and the windowwas also draped with a blanket (R210:9; R212:l 10, 137). Dawn stepped into the room
and picked up her baby from the crib—Officer Billings followed (R210:6; R212:109,
134). Dawn and Officer Billings were in the bedroom for approximately 3-5 seconds
when defendant unexpectedly emerged from the closet, startling both Dawn and the
officer (R205:7-8, 27-28; R210:6, 9). Dawn "screamed out [sic] [her] mom and asked
what her boyfriend was [doing] in [her] room"-Dawn had thought that defendant was in
the kitchen with her mother (R205.33).
Although the closet doors were open, Officer Billings had not previously observed
defendant inside (R210:6; R212:109). Defendant's rapid approach toward him concerned
Officer Billings and he reached for his sidearm (R210:9). Officer Billings also stepped
back and ordered defendant to stop, turn around and place his hands where the officer
could see them (R210:10). He then handcuffed defendant and patted him down for
weapons (R210:10; R212:138). Finding no weapons on defendant's person, Officer
Billings had another officer escort the barefooted and lightly dressed defendant to the
front porch for safety purposes (R210:11,14-16; R212:111).
Because it was "extremely cold" outside, Officer Billings asked an approximately
7-year-old child in the room if the coat defendant had been standing on belonged to him
(defendant) (R210:11, 13,15; R212:lll-112,138-139). The child responded
affirmatively (R210.il). When asked, Dawn also indicated that the coat belonged to
defendant—he had been wearing it "when [she] answered the door" (R205:34). When

4

Officer Billings picked up the coat to take it to defendant, he patted the pockets for safety
purposes: "I'm not going to hand a coat with a loaded gun to somebody in handcuffs"
(R205:23). The officer's frisk of defendant's coat was essentially instantaneous with the
preceding frisk of defendant's person—separated by less than 60 seconds (R212:13).
In patting down the coat, Officer Billings "felt something in the pocket... [that]
[f]elt like a syringe" (R212:l 1). Officer Billings "[has] had hundreds of situations where
[he has] dealt with syringes in the line of duty" (id.). "For the short time that [he] touched
it, [he] could feel the top of the needle where the T part is . . . [he] could feel that there
was a cap over the needle section," and was "confident" that the object was a syringe
(R212:12). Officer Billings took the syringe into his custody "so that it [could not] be
used, destroyed, or used as a weapon against any officers that were there"(R205:20). A
brown liquid in the syringe was later tested and found to be methamphetamine
(R212:153, 155).
Shortly after Officer Billings found the syringe, Officer Woodall retrieved
defendant's shoesfrombeside the bed, not more than three feet from the closet (R205:21;
R212:111, 166). In doing so, Officer Woodall saw a baggy filled with syringes inside one
of the shoes (R212:l 19-20,167-168).
Once the syringes were removed from defendant's coat and shoes, Officer Billings
took these items to defendant on the front porch and placed him under arrest (R205:24;
R210:21).

5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant does not contest that police reasonably suspected he was potentially
dangerous and thus properly frisked him for weapons; the only issue here is whether the
weapons frisk properly included his nearby jacket and shoes. Because the frisk of
defendant's person and that of his jacket and shoes were separated by less than 60
seconds, and because defendant had been standing on or near these items before bolting
from the closet, the trial court found that the checks of defendant's clothing were properly
part of the weapons frisk of his person. This sound ruling is well supported and should be
upheld. Other courts to consider the issue, including the United States Supreme Court,
have similarly rejected defendants' claims that a Terry weapons frisk is limited to a
suspects worn outer-clothing. Moreover, given that defendant would inevitably be
provided his coat and shoes regardless of whether he was ultimately released or arrested,
police prudently first checked them for weapons.
ARGUMENT
WHERE A BAREFOOT AND LIGHTLY DRESSED DEFENDANT
FRIGHTENED BOTH POLICE AND THE APARTMENT TENANT
BY SUDDENLY BOLTING FROM A CLOSET IN A DARK
BEDROOM, POLICE DID NOT EXCEED THE SCOPE OF AN
OTHERWISE JUSTIFIED TERRY FRISK BY CHECKING THE
DISCARDED JACKET AND SHOES AT HIS FEET FOR WEAPONS
Defendant concedes that police reasonably suspected that he was armed and
dangerous and therefore "that the frisk of his person was justified given the totality of the
circumstances as listed by the trial court: darkened room, presence of child, investigation
of potential drug use, surprise, quick exit from the closet and approach towards officer."

Aplt. Br. at 9. Defendant similarly raises no objection to his removal outside the
apartment to the front porch for the duration of the consensual search. Aplt. Br. at 6-10.
Nor does defendant dispute that having patted-down what he believed to be a syringe,
Officer Billings was justified in retrieving the syringe from defendant's jacket. Id.
Defendant's only complaint here is the scope of the weapons frisk itself, i.e., whether it
properly included the discarded coat and shoes at his feet. Aplt. Br. at 9. The trial court's
ruling, that the scope of the weapons frisk was reasonable and proper {see R210:52), is
well-supported and should be upheld.
"The touchstone of [an] analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular government invasion of a
citizen's personal security.'" Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-109 (1977)
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 382 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). "For 'what the Constitution forbids is not
all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Terry, 392 U.S. at 9
(quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (I960)).
A dual inquiry applies in evaluating the reasonableness of a Terry detention. The
first question is "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception,"and the second
is "whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place." Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. Accord State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d
1127, 1131-1132 (Utah 1994). Because defendant does not dispute that the frisk of his
person was justified {see Aplt. Br. at 9), the focus here is on the second inquiry: whether
police exceeded the scope of an otherwise permissible Terry frisk when they checked the

7

coat and shoes at his feet for weapons. As found by the trial court, police acted entirely
reasonably in so doing:
The nub of this case falls on whether or not [Officer Billings] was
justified in picking up that coat and checking it for weapons. . . . We expect
officers to act reasonably and we, we consider whether or not they [are]
reasonable by looking at the totality of the circumstances. I can only
imagine [] Barney Fife conducting a search, making sure the man had no
weapons, and then turning around and handing him the weapon. How
dumb is that. If, if there's a reason to make certain that the man has no
weapon and to remove him from danger, and then immediately as a matter
of courtesy hand him a coat[,] but not check it for weapons that's, that's
ludicrous.
And so my finding is that the, the retrieval of the coat, because of the
totality of the circumstances was so closely related in time that it was
reasonably related to removing [defendant] from the room, and that it was
practically and reasonably necessary to simply pat the coat and make sure
that he wasn't undoing what he had just done by conducting the Terry frisk.
(R210:52). At trial counsel's request, the trial court clarified that defendant had not
requested the coat and that he (the trial court) found the search of the coat to fall within
the parameters of Terry: "[I]t's a reasonable check for weapons before he hands him the
coat due to the fact that it's, it's really cold outside, the defendant is there, it's his coat[]
(R210:54).4
Other courts to consider the scope of a Terry frisk, including the United States
Supreme Court, have ruled similarly, rejecting defendants' claims that a Terry pat-down
is limited to a frisk of the suspect's outer clothing. See e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1047 (1983) (authorizing weapons frisk of vehicle passenger compartment); Servis

4

Neither party took up the trial court's invitation to prepare written findings (see
R210:54).
8

v. Commonwealth, 371 S.E.2d 156, 160-161 (Va. App. 1988) (collecting cases and
observing that "Supreme Court, lower and federal court, and state court cases since Terry
have extended the scope of a frisk beyond the suspect's outer clothing"); Jordan v. State,
531 A.2d 1028, 1031-1032 (Md. App. 1987) (same); State v. Ortiz, 683 P.2d 822, 828
(Haw. 1984) (citing Long and recognizing that "there [was] no question" search of
suspect's knapsack "was valid under the Fourth Amendment and reaching same result
under state constitution). See also United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 532, 534-535 (8th
Cir. 1980) (analogizing to search incident-to-arrest doctrine in upholding weapons search
of duffel bag). Indeed, Long expressly clarified that "Terry need not be read as restricting
the preventative search to the person of the detained suspect." 463 U.S. at 1047. This
clarification is consistent with Utah courts' long recognition "that it is 'essential that law
officers should have reasonable liberty to investigate crimes without undue impediment or
restriction.'" State v. Belgard, 840 P.2d 819, 822 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting State v.
Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1977)). Accord Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347
(6th Cir. 1992) ("We must never allow the theoretical, sanitized world of our imagination
to replace the dangerous and complex world that policemen face every day. What
constitutes 'reasonable' action may seem quite different to someone facing a possible
assailant than to someone analyzing the question at leisure").
As noted above, Long authorizes police to conduct a protective Terry-type search
of a passenger compartment of a vehicle during a traffic stop:
[T]he search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to
those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if
9

the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on 'specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant' the officers in believing that the suspect is
dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control weapons.
Long, 463 U.S. 1049. Accord State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 983-984 (Utah App.
1993) (citing Long and recognizing that "if a police officer has specific articulable facts
which reasonably warrant the officer to believe that the suspect is dangerous and may
gain immediate control of weapons, the officer can search the suspect and those nearby
areas where a weapon may be hidden" (emphasis in original)). In so ruling, the Supreme
Court recognized that its "past cases indicate [] that protection of police and others can
justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a
danger, that roadside encounters between police and suspects are especially hazardous,
and that danger may arise from the possible presence of weapons in the area surrounding
a suspect." Id. at 1049. According to the Supreme Court the issue is simply "'whether a
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his
safety or that of others was in danger.'" Id. at 1050 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).
While the instant facts do not involve an inherently dangerous roadside encounter
as in Long and Strickling, that is not a sufficient ground upon which to distinguish the
result here—a situation equally fraught with danger. As found by the trial court, both
Officer Billings and Dawn were frightened by defendant's sudden emergence from a
closet in a dark bedroom where Dawn's baby was sleeping (see R210:48-50, 52). While
defendant was apparently the boyfriend of Dawn's mother, his presence in the bedroom
was unauthorized, unwanted, threatening and potentially dangerous (id.). Officer
10

Billings's experience that welfare checks based on alleged drug use are frequently
dangerous (see R210:47), was borne out here by defendant's suspicious and alarming bolt
from the closet. Cf. State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219, 51 P.3d 55 (noting the
"combustible nature of domestic disputes"), cert, denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002).
Moreover, the instant weapons search was less intrusive than those upheld in Terry
or in Long. It was less personally invasive than a traditional Terry pat-down because
defendant was not wearing his jacket or shoes at the time. See State v. Schultz, 491
N.E.2d 735, 739 (Ohio App. 1985) (observing that search of an unworn coat "[was] a
significantly less intrusive official act than a search of the person or a Terry-type patdown"). It was also less expansive than the passenger compartment search authorized in
Long because police only checked the two specific items of clothing defendant had
apparently just discarded, and which he was standing on or near at the time he frightened
Officer Billings and Dawn in bolting from the closet (see R210:51). Given these facts,
the trial court reasonably determined that checking defendant's coat and shoes for
weapons were properly part of a justified Terry frisk (see R210:52).
Notwithstanding, defendant makes much of the fact that he had been escorted from
Dawn's bedroom when less than 60 seconds later (see R210:50), Officer Billings checked
his discarded jacket for weapons. Aplt. Br. at 9. However, "'[t]he fact that the protection
of the public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by "less intrusive" means
does not by itself, render the search unreasonable.'" United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S.
675, 686-687 (1985) (quoting Cody v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973)).

11

Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court and this Court have previously rejected
similar challenges to Terry-type weapons searches, albeit in traffic-stop scenarios. Long
specifically recognizes that a suspect might "break away from police control and retrieve
a weapon from his automobile." 463 U.S. at 1051. See also Strickling, 844 P.2d at 984985 (recognizing that "weapons hidden in the passenger compartment of a car might still
be a danger even when the occupants have been temporarily detained outside the car");
State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 870 (Utah App. 1992) (recognizing that "the fact, taken
in isolation, that a suspect is outside a vehicle while an officer is conducting a search does
not overcome an officer's reasonable fear because the suspect may 'break away from
police control and retrieve a weapon from the [the] automobile'" (quoting Long, 463 U.S.
at 1051)).
The same safety rational applies to these facts, as it was just as likely that
defendant could break away from his police escort and retrieve his jacket or shoes. Cf
State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 784-785 (Utah App. 1991 (holding that diaper bag
approximately ten feet away was "sufficiently within the Harrisons' immediate control, as
that term has been construed to permit its search incident to their arrest"). But Cf State v.
Wells, 928 P.2d 386 (Utah App. 1996) (holding that cocaine found in lining of Wells'
jacket was not sufficiently within his control for purposes of a valid search incident-toarrest because, inter alia, the jacket may have been in a different room than that where
Wells was arrested, and there was no evidence of any officer safety concern as to the
jacket).

12

Perhaps more importantly, Officer Billings's intended to give the jacket and shoes
to the lightly dressed and barefoot defendant while he was detained outside in "extremely
cold" December weather (see R210:15, 52). The safety concerns that allow police to
check a vehicle passenger compartment for weapons before allowing the suspect to
reenter surely allow an officer to check a suspect's discarded coat and shoes before
returning the same. See State v. Vasquez, 807 P.2d 520, 523 (Ariz. 1991) (observing that
officer acted prudently in patting down suspect's jacket for weapons before handing it to
defendant, albeit at defendant's request); People v. Bowles, 289 N.Y.S.2d 526, 528 (1968)
(upholding frisk of unworn pants on floor near bed where defendant was discovered
noting that "[i]t would have been perilous to permit the suspect to put his trousers on and
thus permit him access to a dangerous weapon"), cert, denied, 396 U.S. 865 (1969). See
also 4 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure, §9.5(e), p. 284 (3rd ed. 1996) (recognizing that
"there may exist circumstances in which the officer might 'reasonably suspect the
possibility of harm if he returns [property] unexamined' and that in such circumstances
the officer must be allowed to 'inspect the interior of the item before returning it'")
(quoting Model Rules for Law Enforcement, Stop and Frisk, rule 605 (1974)). Indeed,
whether defendant was ultimately arrested or released, and regardless whether he
requested his coat and shoes, reason, if not common courtesy, demanded that defendant
have access to his coat and shoes at some point during the investigative detention. Given
defendant's undisputedly alarming behavior police were wholly justified in first
determining that neither item contained a weapon. Long, 463 U.S. at 1052 (observing

13

that investigations like that in Terry and Long "involve[] a police investigation 'at close
range,' when the officer remains particularly vulnerable in part because a full custodial
arrest has not been effected, and the officer must make a 'quick decision as to how to
protect himself and others form possible danger'") (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 28).
Nevertheless, defendant suggests that no safety issue existed here "unless-or
until-the coat was taken by the officers to [him]." Aplt. Br. At 10. If defendant is
suggesting that the coat and shoes were not properly returned to him because he
deliberately left them behind, he arguably lacks standing to contest their search. See, e.g.,
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991) (holding that officers may seize
contraband a fleeing suspect discards during flight because the suspect has abandoned the
contraband). See also United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1117 (11th Cir. 2002)
(holding that defendants lacked standing to challenge seizure of contraband because it
was seized after they threw it into the ocean); United States v. Edwards, 644 F.2d 1, 2 (5th
Cir.) (per curiam) (recognizing abandonment where a defendant has "voluntarily
discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in the property question"),
cert denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981).
Defendant's further cursory assertions that "there was nothing about the coat or the
surrounding circumstances that caused Officer Billings to believe that there might be a
weapon" therein, and that the officer did not suspect that defendant had committed a drug
crime, are respectively unsupported and ultimately irrelevant. Aplt. Br. at 9-10. Trial
counsel elicited the officer's negative response to his question whether "there was

14

anything about the coat or about the circumstances there that led [the officer] to believe
there might be a weapon in the coat" (R210:20), but the officer's response must be
viewed in the context of his entire testimony. While Officer Billings agreed that there
was nothing patently dangerous about the coat, he was also concerned for his and others'
safety based on the totality of the circumstances, particularly defendant's startling and
suspicious emergence from the bedroom closet (see R210:51-52). Accordingly, as any
prudent officer would, given similar circumstances, Officer Billings reasonably and
justifiably checked defendant's coat for any hidden and dangerous weapons before
handing it to him. See Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1136-1137 (recognizing that subjective focus
on officer's state of mind is inconsistent with Fourth Amendment law: "Thus, the fact that
the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which
provided the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken,
as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action"); Bradford, 839 P.2d
at 871 ("The proper standard is objective, requiring only that a reasonably prudent person
in the police officer's circumstances would believe his or her safety was threatened"). As
for the officer's suspicions of a drug crime, or lack thereof, given that the instant frisk
was eminently justified by an obvious safety concern, it is irrelevant whether the officer
also suspected defendant of a drug crime—an arguably reasonable suspicion on these
facts.
Finally, defendant asserts that the trial court never ruled on the validity of the
search of his shoes. Aplt. Br. at 8 n.5. While the trial court did not make a specific

15

finding in that regard, the trial court made findings regarding the propriety of the frisk
including defendant's jacket and clearly viewed police conduct in frisking defendant and
his nearby clothing as part of a justified Terry frisk (see R210:52). See State v. Ramirez,
814 P.2d 774, 788 (Utah 1991) (recognizing that the appellate court will "uphold[] the
trial court even if it failed to make findings on the record whenever it would be
reasonable to assume that the court actually made such findings"). Cf. American Fork v.
Singleton, 2002 UT app 331,ffif2, 9-10, 57 P.3d 1124 (remanding for entry of findings
where trial court wholly failed to enter any findings in support of its conclusion that the
motion to suppress should be denied).5
Based on the above, the jacket and shoes at issue here were closely identified with
defendant's person and the trial court correctly determined that they fell within the scope
of a permissible Terry frisk. This Court should therefore affirm the denial of defendant's
motion to suppress. In the alternative, if the Court finds that the coat and shoes were not
properly associated with defendant, the Court should find that defendant abandoned these
items and he therefore lacks standing to contest their search.
5

Although not addressed by the trial court, there is an additional justification for
the search of defendant's shoes on these facts—Officer Billings found the
methamphetamine-loaded syringe in defendant's coat before the syringes in defendant's
shoes were found (see R28-27, 205:21). Accordingly, probable cause to arrest preceded
the actual search of defendant's shoes. See State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111-1112 ("A
search is not invalid despite the fact that it precedes a formal arrest, so long as the arrest
and search are substantially contemporaneous and probable cause to effect the arrest
exists independent of the evidence seized in the search"), cert, denied, 113 P.2d 45 (Utah
1989). Therefore, the trial court's ruling, vis-a-vis defendant's shoes, may be affirmed on
this additional ground. See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, f f 10-13, 52 P.3d 1158 ("[A]n
appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal
ground or theory apparent on the record.") (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original).
16

CONCLUSION
The trial court's sound ruling, that police properly checked defendant's person,
coat and shoes for weapons, should be upheld.
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1

He's still securing the area, it's still a Terry frisk.
And the state would ask that you rule that way,

2
3

Your Honor.

Thank you.
COURT'S RULING

4
5

THE JUDGE:

All right.

Thank you.

6

Well, these are interesting facts and I think I

7

need to, I need to make some factual findings before I rule

8

on the law.

9

As I see the evidence and as I understand the

10

evidence this is, this is how I find it for the purposes of

11

this hearing.

12

take it as anonymous because it was never described, it was

13

apparently dispatched so we don't know where the report came

14

from.

15

meth, methamphetamine possibly being used by injection, but

16

at least being used in front of children in the apartment,

17

and that they were going to the apartment for the purpose of

18

determining if children were in danger because of meth use in

19

their presence.

The officers had a report of, and I can only

But the information they were given was that there was

The officer testified from his experience that when

20
21

there is suspected drug use in a residence or in a situation

22

like that that there's a heightened amount of danger, that he

23

goes into it with a, a raised level of apprehension and

24

concern.

25

He knocked on the door.

It was answered by an
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1 older lady and then who was soon joined by a younger lady who
2

was apparently the tenant of the home, she testified at the

3

preliminary hearing.

4

The officer entered the apartment, walked through

5

the apartment, up some stairs, down a hall, around a turn,

6

down a hall, and into a bedroom.

7

was, there was a baby in the bedroom in the crib.

8

was unusually dark, darker than just from turning off the

9

lights, the shades were drawn and there were additional

10

blankets or sheets or something put up to make the room

11

darker than normal.

12

attend to the baby.

13

the concern was whether or not drugs had been used in the

14

room.

15

feet, several steps, I don't recall which.

16

clearly entered the room, had not at that point noticed the

17

defendant, had been there for a couple of seconds, briefly

18

entered the room.

19

It was a back bedroom, it
The room

The mother stepped into the room to
It had been explained to the mother that

The officer followed the mother into the room several
But he had

At that point the defendant came from the closet.

20

The closet, as I understand it the doors were not closed but

21

the defendant had not been seen.

22

he was positioned in the closet or because it was dark, it

23

wasn't made clear, but he hadn't been noticed.

24

the area of the closet quickly.

25

Whether because of the way

The mother was surprised.

He came from

Her testimony was, and
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1

I'm looking at page 33 of the transcript of the preliminary

2

hearing, page 33 line 14, the question was...

3

at line 11. Well starting at the beginning of the page.

4

The question was:

5

Q.

Well, starting

"Were you in the room when Mr. Peterson
came from out of the closet?

6
7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Did that surprise you?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Why?

11

A.

I thought he was still in the kitchen
with my mother.

12
13

Q.

Where was he when the officers arrived?

14

A.

In the kitchen.

15

Q.

He was in the kitchen?

Do you know what

16

he had, did you know that he had then

17

gone and hid in the closet?

18

A.

No, I didn't know where he went.

19

Q.

When you saw him go out of the closet

20
21

what did you exclaim?
A.

I screaming out my mother and"...

22

And I said, "I'm sorry"?

23

The witness said:

24
25

A.

"! I screaming out my mom and asked her
why her boyfriend was in my room."
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1

So the mother was startled, was surprised and was

2

concerned that he had somehow gotten to the, gotten to the

3

room.

4

a sudden movement.

5

So she was frightened.

The officer was frightened,

What happened next is that the officer stopped him,

6

put up his hands, whether he spoke to him or whether he

7

physically stopped him, he stopped him, turned him around, he

8

did a frisk and had him removed from the room.

9

within 60 seconds later, I think at the outside it was

And then

10

within, within a minute, within 60 seconds or a little less

11

he, he sees the coat.

12

year old child, a girl says yes, that's his coat.

13

feels the coat, feels the syringe, and then took the coat out

14

to him and found that he had been taken out to the front

15

porch.

16

He says is this his coat?

And a seven
And he

Those are the facts as I understand them.
I'm, I'm really uncomfortable applying the arrest

17

and search doctrine in cases.

Those, those cases, Chimmel

18

(phonetic) was an automobile stop, and most of those cases

19

arise from stops on the freeway or stops of vehicles. And,

20

and it's very plain that the court is making a bright line so

21

that officers don't have to make those judgment calls, can I

22

search, can I not search.

23

taking a defendant out of a car and making him stand by the

24

side of the road to justify their search, when it would be

25

simply safer to put him in the patrol car and secure the

We don't want them, for instance,
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1

situation before you do a search.
And in any one of those cases that I'm familiar

2
3

with, a Terry frisk of his car is, is really a stretch.

4

Usually what it is is that the officer would have the right

5

to search the car, they have some probable cause, they have

6

some suspicion that justifies a search of the car if the

7

defendant is there.

8

to leave him there because that's dumb and it's not safe by

9

the side of the road.

And the courts have said you don't have

And there are all these circumstances

10

that have to do with automobiles and roadways for officer

11

safety.

12

None of them apply.

This is a house.

The question for me and the totality of the

13

circumstances, the initial frisk was justified, that's the

14

first question.

15

heightened, a heightened concern because of potential drug

16

use, we've got a baby in the room, we've got a darkened room,

17

we've got a person who is by all accounts surprisingly in the

18

room, certainly to the mother, to the officer, who bolts out,

19

comes quickly.

20

circumstances being concerned about his person.

21

stopping the defendant, conducting a Terry frisk and removing

22

him from the room is completely consistent with the totality

23

of the circumstances as I see it.

24

potential drug use from babies.

25

he doesn't, doesn't have proof of drug use he has a situation

And I find that it was.

We've got a

The officer is justified in that totality of
And

He was there to remove
And, and while he hasn't,
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1

that's a concern to the mother, obviously, she didn't expect

2

this man to be in the room.

3

movement.

4

security is absolutely justified.

5

room.

And, and we've got a sudden

The Terry frisk and the action to protect his
Remove him from the

The nub of this case falls on whether or not he was

6
7

justified in picking up that coat and checking it for

8

weapons.

9

and we, we consider whether or not they're reasonable by

We don't...

We expect officers to act reasonably

10

looking at the totality of the circumstances.

11

imagine (short inaudible) Barney Fife conducting a search,

12

making sure the man had no weapons, and then turning around

13

and handing him the weapon.

14

there's a reason to make certain that the man has no weapon

15

and to remove him from danger, and then immediately as a

16

matter of courtesy hand him a coat but not check it for

17

weapons that's, that's ludicrous.

18

I can only

How dumb is that.

If, if

And so my finding is that the, the retrieval of the

19

coat because of the totality of these circumstances was so

20

closely related in time that it was reasonably related to

21

removing him from the room, and that it was practically and

22

reasonably necessary to simply pat the coat and make sure

23

that he wasn't undoing what he had just done by conducting

24

the Terry frisk.

25

Therefore, I deny the motion.
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MR. ELDRIDGE:

1
2

Your Honor may I, may I make two

additional points?

3

THE JUDGE:

No.

4

MR. ELDRIDGE:

5

THE JUDGE:

I've ruled.

May I point you to another case?

Save it for the court of appeals.

6

You've made your argument, I've ruled.

7

denied.

8

MR. EASTON:

9

THE JUDGE:

Thank you, Your Honor.
If you wish to prepare findings I'll

10

be happy to consider them.

11

consider additional argument, Counsel.
MR. ELDRIDGE:

12
13

The motion is

But I'm, I'm not going to
I've ruled.

Well, I'd like to point the case, to

the State vs. Beavers which indicates—

14

THE JUDGE:

Well—

15

MR. ELDRIDGE:

16

THE JUDGE:

17

MR. ELDRIDGE:

18

THE JUDGE:

19

MR. ELDRIDGE:

—that if there's an exigency—

Counsel—
Created by the police that—

Counsel, I have ruled.
Okay.

Now I would, I would make an

20

additional motion, Your Honor, for the Court to reconsider

21

its ruling based on State vs. Beavers, and I've got that case

22

here if you need it.

23

THE JUDGE:

I'm very familiar with State vs.

24

Beavers.

25

understand the circumstances of the case.

That wasn't a (inaudible word) search, and I
But in my view the
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1

totality of the circumstances there and here are different.

2

MR. ELDRIDGE:

And may I, may I ask so the ruling

3

of the Court is that the search of the coat falls under the

4

Terry frisk doctrine?

5

THE JUDGE:

Yes.

6

MR. ELDRIDGE:

7

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

Yes.

That it's, it's a reasonable

8

check for weapons before he hands him the coat due to the

9

fact that it's, it's really cold outside, the defendant is

10

there, it's his coat, he removes the coat with the—
MR. ELDRIDGE:

11

May I ask the Court to make an

12

amendment to their findings that, and I think it's supported

13

by the state, by the testimony of Officer Billings, that

14

Mr. Peterson never asked for the coat?
MR. EASTON:

15
16

I think that's in the record, Your

Honor.
THE JUDGE:

17

That's in the record.

What I will

18

tell you to do because I know that this is a potential basis

19

for appeal, it's critical to the case, either of you or both

20

of you prepare findings.

21

the findings or one of you wants to prepare them and submit

22

them, I'll be happy to look at the findings and sign them so

23

you can have your complete record. I think you understand

24

it.

25

If you can come to an agreement on

We're set for trial next Monday.

Are there other
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1
2

issues we can or need to address before the trial?
MR. EASTON:

I believe in our conference call the

3

other day it was unclear based after the determination of

4

this motion whether it would still be a jury trial.

5
6

THE JUDGE:

It is unless somebody asks me to waive

the jury or asks to waive the jury and—

7

MR. ELDRIDGE:

8

minutes to talk with Mr. Easton—

9
10
11
12
13
14

THE JUDGE:

Your Honor, if I could have a few

Certainly.

MR. ELDRIDGE:

—

and my client Mr. Peterson, we

might have some work to do on that.
THE JUDGE:
minutes or so.

We'll take a short recess for five

Let me know if you need to come back.

WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded.

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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